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Abstract
Control of autonomous mobile robots in dynamical environments is
interesting from a cognitive point of view as well as under application
view points. Stimulus response controls are often favored for fast reactions
to the environment. On the other hand, goals and plans are needed to
guide long term behavior by deliberative control. Layered architectures
are used for combination, but they inherit advantages as well as problems
from both approaches. The paper proposes the Double Pass Architecture
with hierarchically structured options/behaviors providing fast reactions
on all levels.
1 Introduction
Control of autonomous robots in dynamical environments is interesting from
a cognitive point of view as well as under application view points. Technical
requirements are established to construct intelligent autonomous systems in
virtual worlds like the internet as well as in the real world. But still there is an
ongoing debate about the best way to control intelligent behavior. Examples
from nature include
1. Immediate reactions to inputs from the real world [Maes90], [Brooks91]:
This approach can lead to surprisingly complex behavior if the stimulus-
response actions are well tuned. The basic idea behind this approach is to
use the complexity of the environment for control: The best model of the
world is the world itself, complex behavior emerges from the interaction
with the world. But note that virtual reality worlds must simulate the
physical relations including substitutes for body sensors to a very detailed
level to allow efficient stimulus-response behaviors.
2. Actions following long term plans [Bratman87], [Rao/Georgeff91]:
The control uses complex internal models which are analyzed for reachable
goals. Plans are developed to achieve the goals. It needs a lot of efforts to
make appropriate models even for simple behaviors like following a path
while avoiding obstacles in a dynamically changing environment. But
complex behavior (e.g. playing chess or constructing an air plan) needs a
lot of appropriate proactivity.
3. Swarm intelligence [Parunak97]: Complex behavior emerges from the in-
teraction of large groups of simple agents. This approach can be seen as
an extension of the first one using cooperation. Cooperation emerges by
similar reactions of the agents to similar sensory inputs. Moreover, the
results of the activities in the world are used as stimuli of other agents
(e.g. the use of chemical substances as markers by insects). Flexibility
and adaptation are realized by a certain randomness of reactions.
The paper is concerned with individual agents, i.e. with the first two ap-
proaches. Layered architectures are used for combination [Arkin1998, Murphy00]:
Lower layers implement fast reactions using ”behaviors”, higher layers imple-
ment the guidance of behaviors by plans. The higher layers are called with lower
frequencies and have longer reaction times.
Different behavior needs different triggers. Simple stimulus-response behav-
ior is triggered by recent sensory data only. But often the environment does
not provide appropriate sensory data for triggering the achievement of a long
term goal (e.g. running to intercept a ball coming from behind - this point will
be discussed in more detail below). This means the agent needs some knowl-
edge about the situation in the outside world behind the sensory data and some
knowledge about its goals and plans.
More abstractly spoken, the agent possesses ”persistent” (mental) states to
memorize world models and goals, respectively. We call them ”persistent” states
to emphasize their persistence over longer time intervals. This is necessary to
make a clear distinction concerning certain software aspects: During complex
computation processes we have ”intermediate” states. Often used methods for
action selection are decision trees, state machines, rule bases etc. These methods
may go through different ”intermediate” states while performing the selection
process. But these intermediate states are forgotten when the process is finished.
But if the result of the process needs to be stored (like a goal to be achieved
in the future), then this is realized using a persistent state. It is used as an
internal trigger for forthcoming decision processes.
Commonly used notions are ”reactive” and ”deliberative” behavior, respec-
tively. Reactive behavior is mostly understood as simple behavior, without
(persistent) commitment to goals and plans. Deliberative behavior is identified
with complex decisions. There are different aspects mixed in these notions as
• complexity of the decision process,
• ability to anticipate possible future developments,
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• planning capabilities,
• persistent states concerning the past (persistent worldmodel),
• persistent states concerning the future (persistent commitments).
As an example we may consider a chess program: It can anticipate future sit-
uations considering the possible moves of both players starting with the recent
situation. It can evaluate reachable future ”goals” using complicated evaluation
procedures. Finally it comes up with simply the next move, and all intermediate
results are forgotten. After the opponent’s move, the same process starts again
for the new situation without any reference to the previous computations. Is
it a reactive behavior? We cannot solve these terminological problems in this
paper, but we will discuss some of its aspects and the reasons behind.
The practical problems concern rapid reactions to fast changes in the en-
vironment. Reactive behaviors are considered appropriate for rapid reactions,
while deliberative ones are concerned with long term planning. If long term
planning is used in dynamically changing environments, both approaches are
needed, but then they are in conflict concerning their synchronization. Layered
architectures combine deliberative ”higher” layers with reactive ”lower” layers.
Different synchronization strategies are in use, but usually the higher layers
have some delay because they are computationally expensive. Hence only lower
reactive layers react dynamically. Thereby they act according to the long term
goals defined by the higher deliberative layers. But this goals remain the old
ones as long as there is no redeliberation regarding the new requirements. In
fact, there is a real time control problem concerning fast redeliberations.
To allow some kind of short term redeliberation in complex environments, it
is inevitably to restrict the search space for rapid decisions. This corresponds
to concepts of bounded rationality, where a special ”screen of admissibility”
([Bratman87]) is introduced for the restriction of deliberation processes. The
proposal in this paper is a new architecture with two separated passes through
all levels of control as an attempt to combine complex long term decisions with
short term behaviors under real time conditions.
The paper is organized as follows: General aspects of robot controls in dy-
namical environments are considered in Section 2 using the scenario of soccer
playing robots (RoboCup). Control architectures are discussed in Section 3.
Section 4 continues the discussion of control problems, the impacts of these
problems to the design of control architectures are investigated. This analy-
sis leads to the proposal of an hierarchically structured control architecture in
Section 5. It allows for long term and short term decisions on all levels of the
hierarchy. In contrast to other layered architectures, just-in-time decisions are
possible on the higher levels, too.
The author likes to thank the members of the teams ”AT Humboldt” and
”German Team” in the RoboCup for a lot of fruitful discussions. The work is
granted by the German Research Association (DFG) in the research program
1125 ”Cooperating teams of mobile robots in dynamic and competitive environ-
ments”.
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2 Robot Control in Dynamic Environments
Dynamic environments are characterized by fast changes, such that plans may
become invalid by unpredictable events. The robot football (European ”foot-
ball”, i.e. ”soccer”) scenario promoted by the RoboCup initiative [RoboCup]
[Kitano-et-al-97] is best suited as an illustrative example. It provides a dynamic
environment for the football/soccer playing robots. Special characteristics are
the presence of adversaries and the availability of only incomplete, imprecise
data. One may theoretically think about a plan to play the ball via several
players from the goal-kick to the opponents goal, but nobody would expect that
plan to work. Note that there is a great difference to a chess program: It is easy
to write a program for finding the ultimate best moves, it is ”only” a question of
complexity to run this program. But nobody is able to write a similar program
for football/soccer playing robots.
It is important to realize that the robots have to work autonomously without
any outside control. Moreover, there is no global control in our scenario: Each
robot has to decide for its own with restricted knowledge about the environment
and about other robots. Some communication is provided, but not enough
to exchange detailed information about the situation and about decisions (the
amount of data is restricted).
Control structures for intelligent robots/agents include
• sensors and perception unit to get inputs from the environment,
• behavior control (with different complexities ranging from simple stimulus
response behavior to long term deliberative behavior as discussed in this
paper),
• actors and basic action control to act in the environment (sometimes using
direct feed back with sensors),
• operating system for synchronizing the different activities (using parallel
processing if possible).
Communication capabilities are included in the sensors and actors, respectively.
There exist a lot of different approaches for controls of intelligent agents and
intelligent robots (cf. e.g. [Arkin1998, Murphy00, Weiß99]).
2.1 Basic Skills
The football/soccer scenario provides a lot of different situations to illustrate
the needs of agent architectures for dynamic environments. They range from
basic skills up to complex cooperative behavior.
• The raw input information provided by sensors is processed to yield a per-
ception. The resulting data structure models the environment including
the robot itself (especially positions and movements of the ball and of the
players). It is called the ”worldmodel”.
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• The information provided by sensors in a single moment is incomplete
(the ball may be covered by other players) and imprecise (due to noisy
data). It is possible to build a more complete worldmodel using informa-
tion from the past together with the new perception. For example, the
movement of a ball which is covered by other players can be anticipated
using information from the old worldmodel.
The important aspect of such a worldmodel is its persistence with respect
to a time scale regarding sensor inputs and effector outputs. The agent
maintains such a worldmodel as a persistent state with updates according
to new sensory information. Since it is oriented to information from the
past, it is called past-oriented mental state.
• Interception of a moving ball illustrates simple problems of the dynamic
environment: A very simple ”stimulus-response player” would run straight
line to the place where he sees the ball. As the ball is moving he has to
adjust its direction every time he looks for the ball, and he will perform
a curved path as the result. A more skillful player could anticipate the
optimal point for interception and run directly to this point.
• Now we discuss such a procedure for the anticipation of the optimal point
for interception . It calculates the speed vector v for the optimal run to
the ball depending on the recent position p and the speed u of the ball
(relative to the player). It may use additional parameters according to
opponents, whether conditions, noise etc.
The calculation may explicitly exploit physical laws (including e.g. the
expected delay of the ball). It may use simulation (forward model) for
possible speed vectors v of the player. If an inverse model is available, the
optimal speed vector v may be calculated directly. Calculations of v may
use a neural network which has been trained by real or simulated data.
(Which of these methods should be called ”reactive”?)
• We still consider the optimal interception of a moving ball using calcula-
tions of the speed vector v. The calculation can be repeated whenever new
sensor information is available. Therewith it always can regard newest in-
formation and hopefully obtain the best speed vector v. Alternatively, the
player may keep moving according to v for a longer time. Therefore he
needs another kind of persistent state to memorize this goal. Since this
state is oriented to information concerning the future, it may be called
future-oriented mental state. It can save computation time, and it is use-
ful to keep stable behavior (see below).
If the ball is not observable for some time (e.g., if it is covered by another
player), then the persistent goal is used as the trigger to keep running.
Alternatively, simulating the ball in the worldmodel can also be a trigger
to continue the interception process.
• Problems with the reliability of the computed speed vector v arise due to
noise in the sensory data (and may be due to imprecise calculations them-
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selves). Repeated calculations may hence result in oscillations and sub-
optimal behavior (as reported e.g. in [Mu¨ller-Gugenberger/Wendler1998]).
It may be better to follow the old speed vt as long as the difference to the
new speed vt+1 is not too large. Keeping vt in a future oriented mental
state provides the necessary means. Exploiting the inertia of the robot
provides another way using the physical world directly. A complete anal-
ysis of the problems behind stability and flexibility go behind the scope
of this paper (cf. e.g. [Bratman87],[Burkhard00]).
The discussion shows a lot of different approaches and implementations for
the simple behavior ”follow a moving object”. In most cases there is a lot
of redundancies which can be exploited for efficient and more reliable controls
in different ways. It is a typical observation in robot control that the same
behavior can be realized in different ways yielding different trade offs. Since
single methods are often of restricted reliability, the appropriate combination
(regarding the overall system) is a challenging design problem.
To summarize: Two concepts of persistent (”mental”) states have been in-
troduced. It is commonly accepted that some form of persistent state is essential
even for primitive beings. The worldmodel as a persistent state concerning the
past compensates missing sensory information from the outside world. The per-
sistent state concerning the future may be not really necessary at the level of
basic skills.
2.2 Coordination
More complex problems of dynamic environments are illustrated by coordina-
tion. The decision processes become more and more complex (and subject to
stability problems) as the time horizon is enlarged. Even in the recent Sim-
ulation League of RoboCup (the competitions in a virtual environment which
do not suffer from the physical robot problems), a coordinated behavior like a
double pass emerges only sometimes by chance, not by planned activities. Here
are some examples of decision processes in the RoboCup scenario:
• A player decides if he can intercept the ball, i.e. if the ball is reachable
during its move on the playground. The decision process can use the
procedures for computing v from above to calculate the interception point
and time.
• A player decides if he can intercept the ball before any other player. There-
fore he has to compare his own chances with the interception times of other
players (e.g. using the methods to calculate v from the view point of other
players).
• A player decides not to intercept the ball even if he is the first to reach the
ball. The reason may be a team mate in a better position for continuation.
Next we had to discuss the optimal behavior for all the players which are not in
a position to control the ball directly. Their optimal behavior is determined by
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long term strategic items, and it is important for the success of a robot team.
Humans often use predefined behavior patterns for coordination, like change
of wings, double pass etc. in football/soccer. The reader is invited to think
about the related problems as discussed above for interception: maintenance of
information from the past, anticipation of future chances, managing of stability
and optimality, – all under the conditions of dynamic changes and incomplete
imprecise information. There is a growing value of global (symbolic) descriptions
of situations and behaviors in order to guide short term behavior by long term
goals. Goals and plans are memorized by future oriented persistent states for at
least two reasons, namely efficiency (repeated computations should be avoided)
and stability (needed for cooperation of team mates).
3 Architecture Models
3.1 A Simple State Model
The notions of persistent states are discussed somewhat more formally in this
section. A discrete control of the agent is considered for the sake of simplicity.
There is some freedom for choosing the time steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . There are
good reasons to identify the time steps with the arrival of sensory data (”input”)
at the control unit (e.g. we have some kind of event driven control). Note that
persistence depends on this definition: We call a state a persistent state if and
only if it keeps information from one step to the next. The chess program
considered in Section 1 does not have persistent states. It needs no persistent
worldmodel if all board positions are used as input, and it needs no memorizing
of goals if evaluation of possible moves starts from scratch for the new situation.
Computed goals and plans of a football/soccer robot are not persistent as
long as they cannot be used by the decision process in the next time step. (Our
implementation of the control architecture in [Burkhard et al.98] was based on
the notions of belief, desire and intentions to describe intermediate results. Ac-
tually, the concepts did not stand for persistent states since the decision process
was started from the beginning in each time step. But then certain stability
problems occurred like oscillating directions while intercepting the ball. They
were solved by references to old intentions later.)
A generic agent-oriented control architecture with a simple cyclic process
(”sense-think-act”-cycle) is widely used. The cycle is performed at each time
step t.
1. Input (sense): Data have been collected by the agent. They may come
from outside (sensors), via communication and by body information (pro-
prioceptive sensors). The data is preprocessed yielding some internal rep-
resentation of the environment which is called ”worldmodel”. (Here the
notion ”worldmodel” may stand for non-persistent data, too.)
2. Commit (think): The control unit analyses the worldmodel. It may eval-
uate possible courses of actions and possible future situations. It commits
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for actions to be performed immediately and perhaps for long term be-
havior.
3. Output (act): The control unit outputs the advice for actions to be per-
formed by the agent immediately. The actions are performed (may be
after some further processing) by effectors, and by communicators.
The most simple architecture is an architecture without any persistent state
as in Figure 1. Only the most recent input can be used for the control. This
causes no problems if the input is complete and reliable as far as necessary for
commitments.
for t=0,1,2,... do
worldmodelt := perceive(inputt);
commitmentt := deliberate(worldmodelt);
outputt := execute(commitmentt);
Figure 1: Stimulus-response Architecture without Persistent World model
The deliberate-function can be a simple table, a neural network or a com-
plicated decision process using goals and plans – remember the chess program.
But the commitments are used only for the recent output, then they are com-
pletely forgotten in the case of stimulus-response architectures.
Next the stimulus-response architecture with persistent world model is con-
sidered as in Figure 2. A persistent worldmodel allows to regard former inputs.
The agent can try to maintain a complete worldmodel even if the most recent
sensor information is incomplete. The new input is integrated into the existing
worldmodel, missing facts can be simulated to some extend. This means that
the agent has the ability to anticipate world states. It is common understand-
ing that the persistent worldmodel is used only as a ”past-oriented” state which
memorizes information concerning the situation of the outside world: It serves
as a substitute for a complete and precise sensory information by the input.
Again the deliberate-function can be very simple or complex, respectively.
Commitments are used only for the recent output.
As discussed above, efficiency and stability are reasons to memorize previous
commitments to guide further decisions and actions. The deliberate-function
can use complicated processes to evaluate possible future situations, it can make
plans to guide the behavior for a longer time regarding coordination with other
robots. It may be useful or even necessary (for stability) to consider the same
commitment over several time steps. This means to have additional persis-
tent states related to the future. This is considered by the architecture with
persistent states for worldmodel and commitment as given in Figure 3.
The essential difference to the stimulus response architectures is the treat-
ment of commitment as a persistent mental state. It can be split further e.g.
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for t=0,1,2,... do
worldmodelt := update(worldmodelt−1, inputt);
commitmentt := deliberate(worldmodelt);
outputt := execute(commitmentt);
Figure 2: Stimulus-response architecture with Persistent World Model
for t=0,1,2,... do
worldmodelt := update(worldmodelt−1, inputt);
commitmentt := deliberate(commitmentt−1 , worldmodelt);
outputt := execute(commitmentt);
Figure 3: Architecture with Persistent States for Worldmodel and Commitment
into desires, intentions, plans (BDI-architecture) with a lot of variants in the
literature (cf. [Wooldridge99], [Burkhard00]). It serves for efficiency as well as
for stability.
3.2 Layered Architectures
The concept of persistent states works fine as long as there is enough time for
the calculations in a single interval between two time points t and t + 1. But
real time architectures in dynamical environments usually allow for fast action
control (by execute) in short intervals, while sensor integration and update
of the worldmodel as well as commitment need more time. There are severe
synchronization problems.
A common used model is a hierarchical architecture where execute performs
”low level” behavior with short time horizon and fast specification time, e.g. for
collision avoidance. Each such low level behavior is realized by simple methods,
e.g. predefined scripts or in the form of stimulus response behavior. The aim
of the deliberate-function on the higher level is the choice of such a script,
the computation of a plan etc. Following the necessities of ”bounded rational-
ity”, the deliberate process constitutes a reduced ”screen of admissibility”
[Bratman87]:
If the environment is complex then longer computation time is necessary
to analyze the global situation (e.g. for image processing and interpretation,
modeling of other players, calculation of the utilities of different strategies etc.).
But not all aspects of the global situation are subject to fast changes (e.g. the
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ball possession may change very rapidly, but the positions of players do not).
Hence there is the possibility of shared work: Complex analysis is performed
by the ”global” deliberate calculations leading to search space reduction for
”local” short time decisions of execute.
Classical layered two pass architectures have a control flow bottom up from
lower layers to higher layers and then back again to the lowest layer. To act in
time, the higher layers are used only if needed, or with lower frequency. In the
first approach, the lower layers must decide if higher layers have to be involved.
This can yield context problems as discussed in Section 4.2. In the second
approach, higher layers have delays.
Layered one pass architectures have only one control flow through the layers.
To act in time, the higher layers are called with lower frequencies. Implemen-
tations of one pass top-down architectures can use stack-oriented programming
paradigms. Actions are pushed onto a stack. The action a from the top is exe-
cuted if a is low level, otherwise it is replaced by lower level actions a1, . . . , an,
respectively (cf. e.g. [dMARS]). Subroutine calls as used in (procedural) pro-
gramming implement the same principle (using the run time stack). The com-
puted commitment activates a subroutine which performs the necessary actions
for the achievement of the committed goal. The control turns back to the higher
level deliberation process for a new commitment when the subroutine has fin-
ished.
Such layered models have different time scales on their layers. This means
that the synchronization between deliberate and execute is somewhat differ-
ent to the description by Figure 3. The commitment can be understood as a
(may be conditional) plan or script computed on ”higher levels” (by deliberate)
at time t such that
commitmentt = stept, stept+1,..., stept+k .
The ”low level” execute-function computes the outputs for i = t, . . . , t + k
according to that script:
outputi := execute(stepi, inputi ) .
The most recent input inputi (or the worldmodel if available in time) is used
for adaptation. A temporary stimulus response behavior is realized if identical
steps stepi are used. As an example we may think of the commitment to run
to a certain position, where the execute-function has to realize the necessary
movements over a longer time.
While execute is active at each time step t, the higher level commitments
may remain unchanged over longer time intervals in the layered architectures.
In fact using the subroutine-paradigm, the higher level processes are inactive
until the lower level processes are finished. A problem of these approaches is
the difficulty of fast reactions on the higher levels to unexpected changes in the
environment. The problem cannot be overcome by concurrent computations on
the different levels as far as the complete analysis of a global situation (includ-
ing time consuming sensor processing and integration for the worldmodel, and
future simulations, evaluations and means-ends-analysis for the commitment,
respectively) consume more time than only a single interval between two time
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points t and t + 1. We will discuss this matter in Section 4, and the proposal
of the ”Double Pass Architecture” in Section 5 is an attempt to overcome the
problem. The name ”Double Pass Architecture” refers to a difference to the one
pass and two pass architectures, such that two independent passes are performed
top-down for the deliberate- and execute-functions, respectively.
3.3 Classifications of Architectures
The consideration of persistent states can help to understand the differences
between different agent/robot architectures. Especially the notion of ”reac-
tive” agents seems to be unclear as long as it is understood as ”simple behav-
ior”. Choice of actions by a set of condition-action rules [Russell/Norvig95] may
count as an example of simple behavior (but: is any number of rules and any
kind of condition matching simple?). Do Neural Networks implement simple
behavior? [Russell/Norvig95] avoid the name ”reactive” and consider a ”sim-
ple reflex agent” without any persistent state and a ”reflex agent with internal
state”, where the state is considered as a persistent worldmodel. In both cases,
reflexes are considered as ”simple behavior”, implemented by condition-action
rules which are matched against the world model. More complicated reason-
ing is described by agents which are ”goal-based” (trying to achieve goals) and
”utility-based” (trying to maximize utilities).
There are different dimensions to classify agent architectures like complexity
(concerning perception, worldmodel, commitment, ...) and persistence of states
(concerning worldmodel and/or commitments: goals, plans,...). A ”Stimulus
response architecture” denotes an architecture without persistent commitments
(future oriented mental state). It may or may not have a persistent worldmodel
(past oriented mental state). A ”deliberative architecture” denotes an archi-
tecture with both persistent commitment and persistent worldmodel. Noth-
ing is said about simplicity/complexity of the procedures update/perceive,
commitment, execute. A more formal consideration is planned for a forthcom-
ing paper.
Some discussions in the community can be interpreted as asking how far
a persistent commitment state is really needed. As discussed for the player
running for a moving ball, the player can commit for a speed vector v according
to an optimal interception point. He may keep v as a persistent commitment
for a longer time. But he could also repeat the computation of v for each new
worldmodel. The updates of the worldmodel may be performed using new inputs
(if available), or simulations of the expected progress in the outside world. In
any case, the worldmodel can be used as a trigger for the behavior instead of a
persistent commitment to some extend. (Note that we do not allow a mixture
between the contents of the states: We suppose that the data structures of
the worldmodel are restricted to information concerning the outside world only,
goals and plans are not parts of the worldmodel.)
Nevertheless, former commitments could be inferred from a history of the
worldmodel: Knowing the old worldmodels, the old commitments could be re-
computed by the deliberate function and then a recombination to the recent
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commitment is possible (at least theoretically). The actual concern of the dis-
cussion is the possibility to let complex coordinated behavior ”emerge” from
simpler decisions. But the examples of complex coordinated play in section 2
illustrate the difficulties of approaches without persistent commitment.
It is also interesting to note that the algorithms used for the update of the
worldmodel can be used to anticipate hypothetical future situations h worldmodel
using hypothetical inputs h inputt+1, . . . h inputt+k:
worldmodelt+k
:= update( ...(update(worldmodelt, h inputt+1), ...),h inputt+k).
That means: An agent managing a persistent worldmodel has already the
necessary means to simulate expectations of the future. He can compute the
effects of possible actions, evaluate the expected results and then decide what
to do. It means, proactivity is potentially possible whenever a worldmodel can
be manipulated: The step from a stimulus response behavior with persistent
worldmodels to proactivity is not too far.
4 Problems of Control
This section discusses some details of the problems concerning efficient controls.
Efficiency means optimal behavior with respect to given constraints, especially
complexity constraints (”bounded rationality”).
4.1 Trade-offs
As discussed for layered architectures, worldmodel update and deliberation can
be time consuming processes. An accurate analysis of the situation (i.e. by
complex picture processing algorithms) is worthless if it comes too late. There
is a time-trade-off between
• Precise decisions based on a sufficient analysis of the situation: It needs
time for computing the perception from sensory data, its integration into
the worldmodel, the calculation of possible outcomes of available activities,
generation of appropriate plans etc.
versus
• Immediate fast responses to the most recent sensory data: It leaves no
time for complex deliberation.
Layered architectures distinguish between long term decisions (deliberations –
which may need more time), and short term decisions (executions) guided by
the long term ones. The guidance by the long term ones means a smaller scope
of possible choices for the short term decisions and hence shorter computation
times.
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A problem of these architectures are delayed reconsiderations of long term
plans: In the case of unexpected events, the adaptation of the long term com-
mitments may come too late. Therefore collision avoidance is usually part of
the low level behavior. In football/soccer, the ball handling can be considered
as low level behavior, too. But for the other players, their low level behavior
(e.g. running) is not related directly to the ball. Nevertheless, they should react
quickly e.g. in cases when a team mate looses the ball.
The stability-trade-off concerns the consideration and optimal handling
of (unexpected) changes in the environment. It is a trade-off between
• Fast adaptation to new situations in order to act according to the most re-
cent data, and according to the most promising alternatives, respectively,
versus
• Stabile following of old plans in order to pursue an intention. Stabile
behavior is important for resolved acting and for cooperation (to ensure
trustiness).
Both alternatives have their drawbacks: Stability has the danger of fanaticism,
i.e. pursuing of unachievable goals, like keep on running for a pass when the
ball is already controlled by the opponents. Adaptation may lead to permanent
changes of behavior like oscillations, e.g. changing directions while running to
an object.
Adaptation may be very inefficient if the costs for adaptation itself are high
over time (think of an undecided goalie which permanently revises the place of
the ball for a goal kick). Therefore, the costs of adaptation have to be considered,
too. The appreciation of adaptation costs and consequences are a matter of the
time trade-off.
The both trade-offs are directly connected with persistent commitments:
Time can be saved by memorizing commitments. The distinction between short
and long term decisions helps to react faster. Stability needs the consideration
of former decisions which can be memorized by persistent commitments. (But
there exist other possibilities, e.g. the exploitation of physical properties like
inertia.)
There are much more alternatives concerning the construction of robot con-
trols. If the robot performs exact movements then the efforts of motion con-
trol can be reduced. Vice versa, inexact movements may be compensated by
extensive motion control to some extend. This is a another trade off with con-
sequences to deliberation and execution procedures.
4.2 Context
The context problem is best illustrated by the behavior of a player which does
not control the ball. All he can do is changing his position using simple behaviors
like run/walk/stay. Good positions are essential for the success of the team. The
player has a lot of different alternatives related to many different goals. More
than for the ball controlling agent, the optimal behavior depends on the global
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situation, i.e. of the context (like defensive or offensive play, distance to the ball
/ to other players / to the goals, actual score etc.).
In our first RoboCup implementations, position changing was handled on
a global level. A unique procedure had to compute utilities for all situations.
The calculation of useful utilities becomes more and more difficult with growing
numbers of contexts. Thus, our results were rather raw.
A reasonable principle of agent architectures are hierarchical structures:
Complex skills use simpler skills, complex options are structured by simpler
options. Different positioning options can be embedded into larger options like
goal defense, double pass etc. This makes deliberation easier: First the agent
decides for a double pass, then he decides for the appropriate positioning actions
in this context.
In the classical, sequential, stack-oriented software architectures this can
be implemented by successively called subroutines: The ”play soccer method”
calls the ”offensive play method” which calls the ”double pass method” which
calls the ”positioning method” at the right time. Only the most recently called
method/procedure is active (here: ”positioning method”), the callers wait for
the termination of this method. Each subroutine in the stack can be considered
as a ”level” of hierarchically ordered commitments. The number of levels is not
restricted. In contrast, classical layered architectures have a very limited number
of layers (e.g. two or three) which implement different reasoning methods and
which are called with different frequencies.
In the case of unexpected events, the successively called subroutines can
react only on the lowest level, i.e. by the active subroutine. Classical layered
architectures have related problems, they react only on the lowest layer. This
is sufficient as long as the higher layers need no fast changes according to un-
expected events. The long term goal of an unmanned ground vehicle usually
does not change because of an unexpected obstacle. After drawing aside it will
continue its way to the former goal. If there are still serious problems, it can
stop for deliberation. Hence the concept of fast low level reactions works well
for such scenarios.
But, if fast changes are needed on higher levels, then the considerations of
unexpected events could be done best in the appropriate context. For example,
the loss of the ball by the second player during a double pass should be handled
by the ”play soccer method”. It should lead to termination of the ”offensive
play method” and its successively called methods (”double pass method”, ”posi-
tioning method”). At the same time, the ”play soccer method” should activate
the ”defensive play method” with appropriate submethods, e.g. for attacking
the opponents.
If only the ”change position method” is active (e.g. as the active subrou-
tine), all necessary computations (analysis of the situation, test of conditions,
termination of higher level routines up to the ”offensive play method”) must
performed by this method. This leads to a very complex and inefficient ”change
position method”. Moreover, since the ”change position method” is used in
many other contexts, this method becomes overwhelming complex. Alterna-
tively, different ”change position method” could be implementing for different
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Figure 4: Example of an Option Tree
contexts. But this would lead to multiple copies of code.
The problem can be solved if the execute procedure has access to all levels,
and if the decisions to be performed can be restricted. A solution is proposed
in the following Section 5. The Double Pass architecture is intended to permit
real time redeliberation on all levels using principles of bounded rationality.
4.3 Least Commitment
Long term commitments should be not too specific, since the future situations
cannot be anticipated down to the very details in dynamic environments. In the
beginning of a double pass, the first player knows about the sequence of dribble
- pass - run -reposition - intercept, but he does not know the exact parameters
of his pass (the final parameters will depend on the movements of his team mate
and of the opponents). He does not exactly know to which position he will run
afterwards and where he will intercept the ball. All this parameters are specified
as late as possible. It can be considered as a kind of adaptation.
Layered architectures leave the specification to the low level behaviors which
work in the scope of the decisions from higher levels.
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5 The Double Pass Architecture
This section proposes an architecture which deals with the above problems in
a reasonable way. It uses persistent mental states for the past (worldmodel)
and for the future (commitment). It can implement goal-directed approaches,
e.g. the BDI-approach [Bratman87]. It uses a hierarchical structure and a least
commitment strategy. The hierarchical structure provides options on different
levels. It is traversed by two independently running passes.
The hierarchy allows to describe behaviors and plans in a unique way, ranging
from single actions on the lowest level up to long term plans on the highest levels
. The lower level behaviors are combined to higher level plans. The passes
perform different tasks:
The Deliberator performs time consuming processes regarding all aspects of
the recent situation like choice of goals and long term planning. It sets up
a partial hierarchical plan. Following the least commitment idea, the plan
is refined as time goes on. Normally the deliberator does not have time
problems since he works with sufficient forerun. Time critical decisions
are left to the executor.
The Executor performs the contemporary decisions. Based on the prepara-
tory work of the deliberator, its search space is restricted to a minimum of
decisions using the most recent sensory information. In contrast to classi-
cal layered architectures, the executor considers all levels in real time.
Both lines of operation are independently running passes through all (!) levels
of the hierarchy: Thus we have a ”Double Pass” run time structure. This is
in contrast to runtime organization in layered architectures (where short time
decisions only affect the lowest level) and in programming languages (where
only the procedure on the top of the stack is active).
5.1 Options
The data structure from which goals (or desires and intentions) are chosenfrom
are the options. The set of options can be considered as a (virtual) tree structure
with long term options near the root and specific short term actions near the
leaves. An example from the football/soccer domain is given in Figure 4. The
numbers (e.g. in DoublePass/1) denote the role (first player) in a cooperative
behavior.
An option is performed by appropriate suboptions as defined by the tree.
There are two kinds of connections between options and suboptions:
• Choice-Options can be performed by different, alternative suboptions (e.g.
a pass can be performed by a forward-kick, a sideward-kick etc.), cf. Fig-
ure 5 for a Petri Net description of the alternatives of an offensive option.
Transition firing depends on side conditions. ”MaxUtility” means tempo-
ral priority for the transition with highest utility according to the recent
situation. Other conditions are boolean valued.
16
Figure 5: Example of a Choice-Option
• Sequencing-Options are performed by a sequence of suboptions (e.g. the
suboptions of a double pass as described above), cf. Figure 6 for a Petri
Net depicting the suboptions of the double pass option from the perspec-
tive of the player with the role DoublePass/1.
For clarity, the both kinds of connections are not mixed. This is similar to Prolog
concepts: alternative suboptions correspond to different clauses of a predicate,
sequenced suboptions correspond to the subgoals in a clause.
Choice-options describe the different possibilities in the context of that op-
tion. Deliberator activities consist of choices from the alternative suboptions
(e.g. using utilities), calculating appropriate parameters (e.g. the player to
cooperate with in a double pass) and decisions concerning the termination (or
cancellation) of intended activities. Alternative plans can be provided if a plan
is canceled. The hierarchical structure allows for local decisions. Redeliberation
(if needed) is performed in a given context.
Sequencing options describe the steps (suboptions) needed to perform a
higher level option. There have to be well-defined criteria for the transitions
from one suboption to the next one. The evaluation of these criteria is time
critical because they are performed by the executor when acting in response to
the newest sensory data.
According to deliberation and execution, options can be in different states.
The deliberator chooses options/suboptions to be executed as intentions/subintentions,
their state is then called ”intended”. They build a subtree of the option-tree
as shown for a double pass in Figure 7. The complete intention subtree must
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Figure 6: Example of a Sequencing Option
contain one subintention for each choice-option starting in the root down to
some leaves, and all subintentions for each sequencing option. Using the least
commitment principle, the intention tree has the form of a hierarchical partial
plan. Subintentions describe the plan parts on different levels.
At any concrete time point, there exists a unique path in the intention sub-
tree from the root to a leave consisting of the active options. This path is
called activation path. At the time when the first player passes to the sec-
ond one, the activation path in Figure 8 consists of ”PlaySoccer”–”Offensive”–
”DoublePass/1”–”Pass”– ... down to a concrete action (e.g. a kick-command
with specified power and direction).
The executor performs the transition (as soon as the related condition is
satisfied) from an active option to the subsequent option (as provided by the
plan in the form of a sequencing option), and then the subsequent becomes
active. For example, after the pass is finished, the player starts running for a
new position (cf. Figure 6). Transitions are checked (and performed if conditions
are fulfilled) on all levels following the activation path.
Besides intentions, the deliberator can also prepare desires as candidates
for forthcoming or alternative intentions. Desires build a subtree similar to
intentions. The deliberator may choose between different desires when he has
to decide for an intention. Desires can be used as fast available alternatives for
the executor when he has to stop a plan according to unexpected situations. As
an example we might think about the fast switch to scoring a goal (because the
situation allows it) instead of continuing the double pass (a related transition
can be added to the Petri Net in Figure 5).
5.2 Deliberator
The aim of the deliberator is the preparation of intentions as partial hierarchical
plans (built from options) without any time stress (cf. Figure 7). It can prepare
this plan (as a desire) while the executor is stillperforming an old intention. For
example, the deliberatorevaluates the available plans after an intercept while
the robot is still running for the ball. At the same time, other players can
evaluate their contributions to the possible plans of their team mate. As in real
football/soccer, planning from stretch is difficult because of the indetermination
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Figure 7: Intention Subtree as part of the Option Tree
of other player’s behavior. Instead we can use so-called standard situations.
Standard situations provide generic cases of cooperative play. Using methods
from Case Based Reasoning (CBR, cf. [Lenz-et-al98]), a concrete situation can
be matched to the standard situation. For example, a triggering feature for the
double pass is an opponent on the way of an offensive player controlling the ball.
The standard situation (the ”case”) provides a standard scheme (”solution”) for
an intention. Using CBR methods for adaptation, a concrete intention can be
specified. The option hierarchy serves as a structure for describing cases (cf.
Section 6).
The deliberator computes long term decisions. It can be understood as the
deliberate-function from Figure 3.
5.3 Executor
Short time behavior should rely on the newest available data: Hence there is
no place for time consuming deliberations. The advances and the drawbacks
of stimulus-response approaches and layered deliberative approaches have al-
ready been discussed. Stimulus-response architectures allow for fast reactions,
but cannot handle complex long term behavior, while layered deliberative ar-
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Figure 8: Activation Path in the Intention Subtree
chitectures can handle complex long term behavior, but have problems with
dynamically changing situations.
The concept of the special executor pass through all layers is proposed as a
solution. It works according to the recent activity path in the intention subtree.
It starts from the root and proceeds level by level down to the leave which
specifies the next output action to be executed by the robot. On each level it
performs certain tests (e.g. if a subintention should terminate or stop), and it
can calculate parameters according to the newest data (e.g. for performing an
optimal kick). If a subintention is terminated, it performs the transition to the
next subintention. It may also switch to a desire and make it the new intention.
It is essential that all tests and calculations of the executor can be performed
in short time, and that they are performed on the appropriate level. All time
consuming computations should be performed by the deliberator in time before.
The structure of options must be designed for these purposes.
The executor works as soon as new actions are to be performed, and as late
as the newest data relevant for these actions can be analyzed. This can be done
concurrently to the work of the deliberator - which at the same time prepares and
specifies later activities for the executor. In a strictly sequential approach, the
executor must interrupt the interpreter. Concrete implementations are possible
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in different ways, they are still in an experimental state.
The executor operates over the restricted search space of the intention tree
provided by the deliberator. It can be understood as the implementation of the
execute-function from Figure 3, but regarding all levels.
5.4 Main Features of the Double Pass Architecture
The option hierarchy allows for unique descriptions of behaviors and plans on
different levels. All levels are treated the same way. An important feature of
the Double Pass Architecture is the possibility of immediate reactions on all
levels. It can be described as a ”doubled one-pass-architecture”: One-pass-
architectures have a control flow which passes through each level only once. In
our case, the control flow is directed bottom-down from the highest level to
the lowest one. The difference consists in the fact, that there are two separated
passes: One pass for the deliberator which prepares commitments (e.g. goal and
plans), and another path for the executor which allows for real time reactions on
all levels. The executor allows for a certain kind of stimulus-response behavior
on all levels, where the stimulus-response behavior has been prepared by the
deliberator. The executor realizes real-time behavior, while the deliberator acts
without short time constraints.
Classical layered one- and two-pass architectures in complex dynamical en-
vironments have serious synchronization problems. Computations on higher
(deliberative) layers are performed in longer time intervals, and rapid responses
to changes in the environment are possible only at the lower (reactive) layers.
The executor of the Double Pass Architecture works in short time intervals like
the reactive components of classical layered architectures, but it passes through
the higher levels, too. This is possible without synchronization problems since
the deliberator prepares a restricted search space (the intention tree) for the
executor.
The requirement to run through all levels by the executor needs a special
runtime organization. Most runtime organization methods in programming are
based on stacks, where a higher level method is called again only when the
lower level has terminated. This holds for imperative languages as well as for
descriptive ones, and it is used in agent architectures, too. The implementation
of the new runtime strategy is still under work.
6 Conclusion, Further Work
The paper has discussed different aspects of basic approaches for robot/agent
control. The notions of persistent states (concerning the past and the future, re-
spectively) have been identified as characteristic concepts. Different approaches
can be classified along these lines. They provide more clear differences than the
classical notions of reactive and deliberative behavior. The classification helps
to identify the problems of real time controls in dynamical environments when
long term planning is involved. The Double Pass Architecture was proposed
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to avoid the difficulties of layered architectures in dynamically changing envi-
ronments. It allows for fast adaptations to new situations even on the higher
levels.
Future plans include the use of the new architecture for robot learning.
The project ”Architectures and Learning on the Base of Mental Models” of
the research program 1125 ”Cooperating teams of mobile robots in dynamic
and competitive environments” granted by the German Research Association
(DFG) investigates the usage of CBR methods for control of robots. The cases
correspond to generic behavior which can be specified and adapted according to
the current situation. There are two main goals for using CBR: The first goal is
the efficient control, while the second goal is learning from experience. Learning
can be twofold: New cases can be acquired as templates for behavior, and
the usage of existing cases can be improved by better analysis and adaptation
methods.
There have already been some attempts to use CBR-methods for Robot
Control, e.g. for opponent positioning models [Wendler/Lenz98], and for lo-
calization [Wendler et. al.00]. The investigations in opponent modeling have
discovered a problem of dynamics when using CBR for low level behavior: As
soon as the team tries to adapt to the opponents positions, the opponents did
change to other positions. In the consequence, we need adaptation to higher
level strategies. The option hierarchy serves as a structure for describing higher
level cases. It gives room for off-line learning as well as on-line learning.
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